[48], This Magic summary includes messages from both Togo and Sato. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), The mushroom cloud billowing up 20,000 feet over Hiroshima on the morning of August 6, 1945 (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC), The Enola Gay returns to Tinian Island after the strike on Hiroshima. According to the official US version of history, an A-bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, and another on Nagasaki three days later, to force Japan to surrender. At this time, several treaties were in place to limit the size of navies in the Pacific Ocean. Arguing that continuing the war would reduce the nation to ashes, his words about bearing the unbearable and sadness over wartime losses and suffering prefigured the language that Hirohito would use in his public announcement the next day. The entries for 8 and 9 August, prepared in light of the bombing of Hiroshima, include discussion of the British contribution to the Manhattan Project, Harriman (his nibs) report on his meeting with Molotov about the Soviet declaration of war, and speculation about the impact of the bombing of Hiroshima on the Soviet decision. [31], RG 107, Office of Assistant Secretary of War Formerly Classified Correspondence of John J. McCloy, 1941-1945, box 38, ASW 387 Japan. However, the Department of the Interior opposed the disclosure of the nature of the weapon. The record of this meeting has figured in the complex debate over the estimates of casualties stemming from a possible invasion of Japan. Japan was already a day late in responding to the Byrnes Note and Hirohito agreed to move quickly. Barton J. Bernstein has observed that Groves recommendation that troops could move into the immediate explosion area within a half hour demonstrates the prevalent lack of top-level knowledge of the dangers of nuclear weapons effects. Groves did not mention this but around the time he wrote this the Manhattan Project had working at its far-flung installations over 125,000 people ; taking into account high labor turnover some 485,000 people worked on the project (1 out of every 250 people in the country at that time). Bix, Japan's Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War,Japan Focus. [76]. Brown Papers, box 68, folder 13, Transcript/Draft B, Returning from the Potsdam Conference, sailing on the U.S.S. The initial radiation from the detonation would be fatal within a radius of about 6/10ths of a mile and injurious within a radius of a mile. Were there alternatives to the use of the weapons? 8 devine street north haven, ct what is berth preference in irctc atomic bomb dropped to intimidate russia. Lower image - August 11, 1945, photo by 6th Photo Reconnaissance Group The force of B-29 nuclear delivery vehicles that was being readied for first nuclear usethe Army Air Forces 509th Composite Grouprequired an operational base in the Western Pacific. What concepts did war planners use to select targets? The US and Japan suffered major casualties, and the American people and the president were getting tired of it. Alperovitz, 281-282. Evaluate this . For the maneuverings on August 9 and the role of thekokutai, see Hasegawa, 3-4, 205-214. [55] On 22 July Marshall asked Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas Handy to prepare a draft; General Groves wrote one which went to Potsdam for Marshalls approval. After the first minute of dropping Fat Man, 39,000 men, women and children were killed. It is commonly believed that the awesome devastation of the atomic bombs caused the Japanese government to capitulate. After the first minute of dropping "Fat Man," 39,000 men, women and children were killed. On the other hand much of the confirmed evidence Alperovitz presented was baffling. Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 916-917 [Translation by Hikaru Tajima], In 1944 Navy minister Mitsumasa Yonai ordered rear admiral Sokichi Takagi to go on sick leave so that he could undertake a secret mission to find a way to end the war. 25,000 more were injured. The George Washington University According to Robert S. Norris, this was the fateful decision to turn over the atomic project to military control.[8]. Searle, `It Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers, 118. Sadao Asada emphasizes the shock of the atomic bombs, while Herbert Bix has suggested that Hiroshima and the Soviet declaration of war made Hirohito and his court believe that failure to end the war could lead to the destruction of the imperial house. How is the current debate about immigration in the United States rooted in our nations past? [5]. To keep the secret, Bush wanted to avoid a ruinous appropriations request to Congress and asked Roosevelt to ask Congress for the necessary discretionary funds. The British National Archives, Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FO 800/461. Zenshiro Hoshina, a senior naval official, attended the conference and prepared a detailed account. The numbered items are military and industrial installations with the percentages of total destruction. The United States used the bomb to end the war with Japan, which began in 1941 when Japan launched an unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor. Why were alternatives not pursued? On December 15th, 1945, he delcared that the A-bomb had save one-quarter million American lives. In light of Japans efforts to seek Soviet mediation, Stalin wanted to enter the war quickly lest Tokyo reach a compromise peace with the Americans and the British at Moscows expense. Relations between the United States and Japan worsened when Japanese forces took aim at Indochina with the goal of capturing oil rich areas of the East Indies. John HerseysHiroshima, first published in the New Yorkerin 1946 encouraged unsettled readers to question the bombings while church groups and some commentators, most prominently Norman Cousins, explicitly criticized them. However, many historians believe that the attack on Japan-occupied Manchuria by the previously neutral Soviet Union on August 8 had more impact on Japan's leaders. See also Walker (2005), 316-317. If ending the war quickly was the most important motivation of Truman and his advisers to what extent did they see an atomic diplomacy capability as a bonus? [23] It is possible that Truman was informed of such discussions and their conclusions, although he clung to a belief that the prospective targets were strictly military. When the Foreign Minister met with the Emperor, Hirohito agreed with him; he declared that the top priority was an early end to the war, although it would be acceptable to seek better surrender terms--probably U.S. acceptance of a figure-head emperor--if it did not interfere with that goal. In light of those instructions, Togo and Prime Minister Suzuki agreed that the Supreme War Council should meet the next day. I. As Alperovitz notes, the Davies papers include variant diary entries and it is difficult to know which are the most accurate. On August 9, 1945, another bomber was in route to Japan, only this time they were heading for Nagasaki with "Fat Man," another atomic bomb. [12]. Japans cultural capital, Kyoto, would not stay on the list. Updated National Security Archive Posting Marks 75thAnniversary of the Atomic Bombings of Japan and the End of World War II, Extensive Compilation of Primary Source Documents Explores Manhattan Project, Eisenhowers Early Misgivings about First Nuclear Use, Curtis LeMay and the Firebombing of Tokyo, Debates over Japanese Surrender Terms, Atomic Targeting Decisions, and Lagging Awareness of Radiation Effects, First update - April 27, 2007 That there may be a difference between the two sources becomes evident from some of the entries; for example, in the entry for July 18, 1945 Brown wrote: "Although I knew about the atomic bomb when I wrote these notes, I dared not place it in writing in my book., The degree to which the typed-up version reflects the original is worth investigating. According to an Eyewitness Account (and Estimates Heard) In Regard to the Bombing of Hiroshima: Casualties have been estimated at 100,000 persons., Zenshiro Hoshina, Daitoa Senso Hishi: Hoshina Zenshiro Kaiso-roku [Secret History of the Greater East Asia War: Memoir of Zenshiro Hoshina] (Tokyo, Japan: Hara-Shobo, 1975), excerpts from Section 5, The Emperor made go-seidan [= the sacred decision] the decision to terminate the war, 139-149 [translation by Hikaru Tajima]. Marshall noted the opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered employment of such force. This document has played a role in arguments developed by Barton J. Bernstein that figures such as Marshall and Stimson were caught between an older morality that opposed the intentional killing of non-combatants and a newer one that stressed virtually total war.[22], RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. Alperovitz, 147; Robert James Maddox,Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 52; Gabiel Kolko,The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945(New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 421-422. Sean Malloy, `A Very Pleasant Way to Die: Radiation Effects and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb against Japan,Diplomatic History36 (2012), especially 523. Nevertheless, his diary suggests that military hard-liners were very much in charge and that Prime Minister Suzuki was talking tough against surrender, by evoking last ditch moments in Japanese history and warning of the danger that subordinate commanders might not obey surrender orders. Drawing on contemporary documents and journals, Masuji Ibuses novelBlack Rain(Tokyo, Kodansha, 1982) provides an unforgettable account of the bombing of Hiroshima and its aftermath. If Russia used a nuclear weapon of any type, "I expect (the president) to say we're in a new situation, and the U.S. will directly enter the war against Russia to stop this government that has . The proposal has been characterized as the most comprehensive attempt by any American policymaker to leverage diplomacy in order to shorten the Pacific War. A. Zolotarev, ed., Sovetsko-Iaponskaia Voina 1945 Goda: Istoriia Voenno-Politicheskogo Protivoborstva Dvukh Derzhav v 3040e Gody (Moscow: Terra, 1997 and 2000), Vol. Intimidation to the brim On August 1945, America dropped an atomic bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The alternative is prompt and utter destruction. The next day, in response to questions from journalists about the governments reaction to the ultimatum, Prime Minister Suzuki apparently said that We can only ignore [mokusatsu] it. Churchill and India: Manipulation or Betrayal? President Franklin Roosevelt called the attack a day which will live in infamy, and the American people were shocked and angered. Consistent with his earlier attempts, Stimson encouraged Truman to find ways to expedite Japans surrender by using kindness and tact and not treating them in the same way as the Germans. Claypool, 1984) With such motivation to back them, the United States felt justified in dropping the atomic bomb in order to prevent the spread of communism in Europe by intimidating Russia. Reminding Stimson about the objections of some Manhattan project scientists to military use of the bomb, Harrison summarized the basic arguments of the Franck report. While Army Minister Anami tacitly threatened a coup (civil war), the emperor accepted the majority view that the reply to the Potsdam declaration should include only one condition not the four urged by Big Six. Nevertheless, the condition that Hirohito accepted was not the one that foreign minister Togo had brought to the conference. After the first successful test of the atomic bomb in 1945, U.S. officials immediately considered the potential non-military benefits that could be derived from the American nuclear monopoly. Also included, to give a wider perspective, were translations of Japanese documents not widely available before. National Security Agency Mandatory declassification review release. As Yonai explained to Tagaki, he had also confronted naval vice Chief Takijiro Onishi to make sure that he obeyed any decision by the Emperor. Moreover, the atrocities of the bombs were not made graphically public to the Japanese people until August 6, 1952, when Asahi Graphpublished the issue titled Genbaku higai no shokkai (the first publication of the damages of the atomic bomb). [36]. (Truman finally cut off military aid to France to compel the French to pull back). On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on the people of Hiroshima. With direct access to the documents, readers may develop their own answers to the questions raised above. Some months later, with the Manhattan Project already underway and under the direction of General Leslie Grove, Bush outlined to Roosevelt the effort necessary to produce six fission bombs. [37], RG 165, Army Operations OPD Executive File #17, Item 13 (copy courtesy of J. Samuel Walker), The day after the Togo message was reported, Army intelligence chief Weckerling proposed several possible explanations of the Japanese diplomatic initiative. Still unaware of radiation effects, Truman emphasized the explosive yield. The discussion of area bombing may have reminded him that Japanese civilians remained at risk from U.S. bombing operations. [1], Ever since the atomic bombs were exploded over Japanese cities, historians, social scientists, journalists, World War II veterans, and ordinary citizens have engaged in intense controversy about the events of August 1945. [20], Harrison-Bundy Files relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1942-1946, microfilm publication M1108 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1980), File 77: "Interim Committee - International Control.". Stimsons account of the events of 10 August focused on the debate over the reply to the Japanese note, especially the question of the Emperors status. [16], RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. Various personnel and guards are standing around the loading area. With respect to the latter, It is possible that the destructive effects on life caused by the intense radioactivity of the products of the explosion may be as important as those of the explosion itself. This insight was overlooked when top officials of the Manhattan Project considered the targeting of Japan during 1945. [78]. Historians Herbert Feis and Gar Alperovitz raised searching questions about the first use of nuclear weapons and their broader political and diplomatic implications. Barton Bernstein and Richard Frank, among others, have argued that Trumans assertion that the atomic targets were military objectives suggested that either he did not understand the power of the new weapons or had simply deceived himself about the nature of the targets. To keep his pledge at Yalta to enter the war against Japan and to secure the territorial concessions promised at the conference (e.g., Soviet annexation of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin and a Soviet naval base at Port Arthur, etc.) [74]. Alperovitz treated this entry as evidence in support of the atomic diplomacy argument, but other historians, ranging from Robert Maddox to Gabriel Kolko, have denied that the timing of the Potsdam conference had anything to do with the goal of using the bomb to intimidate the Soviets. Tsar Bomba, (Russian: "King of Bombs") , byname of RDS-220, also called Big Ivan, Soviet thermonuclear bomb that was detonated in a test over Novaya Zemlya island in the Arctic Ocean on October 30, 1961. During a conversation with Joseph E. Davies, a prominent Washington lawyer and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Truman said that he wanted to delay talks with Stalin and Churchill until July when the first atomic device had been tested. To produce material for any of those purposes required a capability to separate uranium isotopes in order to produce fissionable U-235. Bernstein (1995), 144. Barton J. Bernstein, Introduction to Helen S. Hawkins et al. victor vescovo partner monika. Frank, 286-287; Sherwin, 233-237; Bernstein (1995), 150; Maddox, 148. RG 77, MED, H-B files, folder no. [46]. As Hull explained, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, etc. Nearer the tactical use, Seaman agreed and they discussed the tactics that could be used for beach landings. Richard Frank sees this as evidence of the uncertainty felt by senior officials about the situation in early August; Forrestal would not have been so audacious to take an action that could ignite a political firestorm if he seriously thought the end of the war was near., Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman, box 181, Chron File Aug 5-9, 1945, Shortly after the Soviets declared war on Japan, in line with commitments made at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Ambassador Harriman met with Stalin, with George Kennan keeping the U.S. record of the meeting. A few weeks later, on September 2, 1945 Japanese representatives signed surrender documents on the USS Missouri, in Tokyo harbor.[71]. [19], Joseph E. Davies Papers, Library of Congress, box 17, 21 May 1945, While officials at the Pentagon continued to look closely at the problem of atomic targets, President Truman, like Stimson, was thinking about the diplomatic implications of the bomb. [43]. Richard Frank sees this brief discussion of Japans interest in Soviet diplomatic assistance as crucial evidence that Admiral Leahy had been sharing MAGIC information with President Truman. Not knowing that the Soviets had already made a commitment to their Allies to declare war on Japan, Tokyo fruitlessly pursued this option for several weeks. 5, This review of Japanese capabilities and intentions portrays an economy and society under tremendous strain; nevertheless, the ground component of the Japanese armed forces remains Japans greatest military asset. Alperovitz sees statements in this estimate about the impact of Soviet entry into the war and the possibility of a conditional surrender involving survival of the emperor as an institution as more evidence that the policymakers saw alternatives to nuclear weapons use.